The pursuit for the "natural-self" chapter one: taming the mystic (Marrakesh, 1160s) -- Climbing the ladder of philosophy (Barcelona, 1348) -- Rejecting authority, defying predestination and conquering nature (Florence, 1493) -- Employing the self, experimenting nature (Oxford, 1671) -- From individual autodidacts to utopian scientific societies.

The Panthéon and Arc de Triomphe are two neoclassical Parisian monuments that were created in the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, respectively, and which have ever since been main sites of French official memory. However, they never had the same share of the stage: when one was prominent, the other was marginal, and vice versa. This chapter delineates the parallel histories of these monuments and analyses the relationship between them, from the (...) French Revolution to the Fifth Republic. Although they are usually ascribed to different political camps – the Pantheon to the left and the Arc de Triomphe to the right – a close reading of the context of various commemorative acts that were performed inside and around these monuments shows that their identity was more complex. (shrink)

(1994). An impossible pluralism? European jews and oriental Jews in the Israeli history curriculum. History of European Ideas: Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 41-51.

In 1637 a Frenchman named Noël Duret published a book in Paris that referred to the heliocentric Copernican system. In 1660 an Ottoman scholar named Ibrahim Efendi al-Zigetvari Tezkireci translated the book into Arabic. For more than three centuries this manuscript was buried in an Ottoman archive in Istanbul until it resurfaced at the beginning of the 1990s. The discovery of the Arabic text has necessitated a re-evaluation of the history of early modern Arabic natural philosophy, one that takes into (...) account the intellectual context of Ibrahim Efendi and the overarching trends in the world of Sufi mysticism. These trends were reflected in art, literature, philosophy and natural philosophy. Using philological and cultural clues, as well as Ibrahim Efendi's own words, we can attempt deductions about why, how and for what purposes Ibrahim Efendi chose Duret's book for his project. (shrink)

1. Lo taḥamod. Lo titʼaṿeh. Lo taḥanifu. Isur genevat daʻat. Lo teḳalel. Lo tiḳom ṿe-lo tiṭor -- ḥeleḳ 2. Lo tiśna ṿa-ahavat le-reʻakha. Ahavat ha-ger -- ḥeleḳ 3. Onaʼat devarim. Hilkhot panim. Onaʼat ha-ger -- ḥeleḳ 4. Isur hakaʼah. Mitsṿot maʻaḳeh. Shemirat ha-guf -- ḥeleḳ 6. Kibud av ṿe-em. Kibud melamde ha-Torah ve-ḥakhameha. Kibud kohen.

Haḳdamat Mesilat yesharim, śiḥah 1 -- Mesilat yesharim, śiḥah 2 -- Mesilat yesharim, śiḥah 3.

"a remarkable work of scholarship..".

In this Article we attempt to narrow the gap between developed and developing countries’ respective perceptions of justice in the context of climate change. We show that, in spite of its intuitive appeal, the equal per-capita argument is not grounded in any general moral principle and therefore cannot provide an answer to the question regarding what would be a fair allocation of emission rights. We argue that the underlying moral theory is global distributive justice theory, which unfortunately can only be (...) of very limited help. We briefly discuss the various particular principles/considerations that are offered in the literature either in support or in criticism of the equal percapita allocation and find that upon close analysis they generally support the developing countries’ view, but not a per-capita allocation of emission rights. We conclude with a practical suggestion. (shrink)

Avner Baz presents a critique of the working practices of analytic philosophy in recent decades. He challenges the assumptions on which the philosophical 'method of cases' rests, and he presents a pragmatist conception of language on which the method of cases as used both 'armchair' and 'experimental' philosophers is fundamentally misguided.

The basic conflict: an initial characterization -- The main arguments against ordinary language philosophy -- Must philosophers rely on intuitions? -- Contextualism and the burden of knowledge -- Contextualism, anti-contextualism, and knowing as being in a position to give assurance -- Conclusion: skepticism and the dialectic of (semantically pure) "knowledge" -- Epilogue: ordinary language philosophy, Kant, and the roots of antinomial thinking.

Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the (...) following views: pleasure, rather than achievement or the satisfaction of desire, is what makes life go well; death is generally bad for its victim, in virtue of depriving the victim of more of a good life; death is bad for its victim at times after death, in particular at all those times at which the victim would have been living well; death is worse the earlier it occurs, and hence it is worse to die as an infant than as an adult; death is usually bad for animals and fetuses, in just the same way it is bad for adult humans; things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more good life is possible. (shrink)